He said, “An agreement is an agreement and it is important that you stick to that agreement and stick to the contract if you want the one you made.” We said that we would give him the money and that we had to stick to our agreement. While the AU`s efforts to advance negotiations and calm violence have stalled, Russia has significantly intensified its own involvement in the Central African Republic. In October 2017, President Tuadéra accepted Moscow`s offer to develop weapons and train the country`s armed forces. [fn] In August 2017, France requested a waiver of the UN sanctions regime against the Central African Republic for the delivery to Bangui of weapons seized off the coast of Somalia in 2016. Russia vetoed the waiver, which was supported by other members of the Security Council. In October, Russia requested an exemption for its own supply, which the Security Council granted unanimously. See “Central African Republic: Moscow in Ambush,” Jeune Afrique, August 26, 2018; and “How Russia Moved in Central Africa,” Reuters, October 17, 2018.Hide the footnote In 2018, an unconfirmed number of Russian army officers and several hundred employees of the Russian private security company Wagner sent to the Central African Republic, while a Russian citizen, Valery Zakharov, served as Touadéra`s security adviser. Touadéra then replaced his Rwandan close protection unit with a Russian team. Bangui and Moscow signed a military cooperation agreement in August 2018. What`s up? In February, the government of the Central African Republic signed an agreement with armed groups that control large parts of the country and pledged to integrate fighters from certain groups into new army units and their leaders into the government. The agreement has mobilized international support, but violence in the provinces continues. The February 6 agreement and the period leading up to it brought dividends. First, Chergui`s ability to place the Russian-Sudanese initiative under the aegis of AU-led mediation was important to avoid confusion, forum shopping and further break-up of the peace process.
Secondly, the inclusion of sudan and Chad in the Khartoum talks and the appointment of the latter as guarantor and mediator of the agreement, supported by diplomatic pressure, could lead to both playing a more positive role; According to Western and African diplomats in Bangui, Chad is already under pressure from their governments to persuade some armed groups to curb abuses. [fn] Crisis Group interviews, Bangui, May 2019.Hide footnote Third, the agreement reaffirms the commitments of the government and armed groups to address the issues of weakness and underdevelopment of the state that underlie the instability in the Central African Republic. Finally, it reaffirms the commitments of the parties and international partners on important issues such as the demobilization and transformation of armed groups into political parties, the attitude of the public sector to fairly represent different communities, as well as cross-border cooperation in pastoralism. [fn] The revival of regional cooperation in pastoralism has been discussed in several previous reports of the crisis group. Hide footnote So if you reach an agreement in a dispute before a lawsuit is filed, you probably don`t need to get that agreement in writing. But the best course of action is to write and sign this settlement agreement – consider hiring a lawyer – or at least exchange emails that confirm that everyone agrees to the same terms. The parties appear to have emerged from the Khartoum talks with varying degrees of understanding of some of the critical points of the agreement. [fn] While most negotiations are based on widely opposed views, some have argued to the Crisis Group, and even one au panel member admitted that a combination of preparation that did not result and a brief round of talks in Khartoum meant that much of the detailed negotiations were left until the agreement was signed. Most, if not all, of the more than a hundred “demands” of armed groups that the panel had gathered in 2017 and 2018 were already known. Similarly, informed observers and officials in Bangui and Addis Ababa say the channels of communication between the AU body and the headquarters in Addis Ababa have been weak throughout 2018, leaving the panel with little political support. Interviews with crisis groups, Western and African diplomats, members of civil society involved in mediation, Bangui, Addis Ababa, March and May 2019 Hide footnote An early manifestation was the opposition of armed groups to President Touadéra`s March 3 cabinet, illustrating the different understanding of Bangui`s commitment to inclusion. .
